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Comments
AN UNIMPROVED LIE: GENDER DISCRIMINATION
CONTINUES AT AUGUSTA NATIONAL GOLF CLUB
Women are welcome as guests, they may play anytime they like,
they have a lovely changing room, but the club is for men. What
could possibly be wrong with that?'
I. INTRODUCTION
The tradition of the Masters began in 1934 when Bob Jones
and Clifford Roberts decided to hold an annual golf tournament.2
Originally named the Augusta National Invitation Tournament, the
tournament's name was changed to the Masters Tournament in
1939, five years after the first tee-off.3 Many of the original rules
and regulations are still observed today. 4 Among them are "the
four-day stroke playing of [eighteen] holes each day... , eliminat-
ing qualifying rounds, and denying permission for anyone except
the player and the caddie to be in the playing area."5 These tradi-
tions have endured through the three years the tournament was not
played because of World War II, amidst amazing shots, shattered
records, and the admission of the club's first African-American
member. 6 However, one of the Masters' longest standing policies
1. Michael Bamberger, She Means Business- A Letter Asking Augusta National to
Admit Women Set Off the Boss of the Masters, and a Firestorm that Continues to Burn,
SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, July 29, 2002, 1 1, 2002 WL 24262648. This statement was
made by Ian Brooks, a member of the Honourable Company of Edinburgh Golf-
ers, in reference to the equal access of women in "men's only" golf clubs. See id.
Even though this statement was not made in reference to Augusta National Golf
Club's policy, or an opinion expressed by a current member of the club, it repre-
sents the sentiment expressed by some members of men's only golf clubs. See id.
2. See History of the Masters: History at a Glance, 1 1, at http://www.masters.org/
enUS/history/index.html (last visited Jan. 14, 2004) [hereinafter Masters].
3. See id.
4. See id. 2 (discussing long-standing traditions and relative permanence of
rules at Masters).
5. Id.
6. See id. 11 3-4 (discussing significant events in Masters' history); see also Bam-
berger, supra note 1, 11 5-6 (noting acceptance of Ron Townsend as first black
member). "In 1935 Gene Sarazen hit 'the shot heard 'round the world' scoring a
double eagle on the par 5 15th hole, tying Craig Wood and forcing a playoff."
Masters, supra note 2, 1 3. "[T]he Tournament was not played the following three
years, 1943, 1944 and 1945, during the war." Id. "[I]n 1965-1966 Jack Nicklaus
became the first Masters champion to defend his title successfully." Id. 1 4. Seve
(111)
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does not relate to the tournament itself, but to the club that hosts
the Masters Championship, the Augusta National Golf Club ("Au-
gusta National"). That is, since Augusta National opened its
greens, the club has not admitted a woman member.7
The continued non-admittance of women at Augusta National
constantly raises the question: How long will Augusta National's tra-
dition of discrimination continue? In June 2002, Martha Burk,
chairwoman of the National Council of Women's Organizations
("NCWO"), called for Augusta National to admit women as full
members.8 Once again, the spotlight was on Augusta National's
greens, with numerous supporters of female membership asking
some of golfs greatest players to boycott the 2003 Masters.9 Al-
though no professional golfers, including Tiger Woods, have taken
up the charge to boycott the championship, the issue is not dor-
mant.10 In light of the looming controversy, Augusta National
dropped all of its corporate sponsors for the 2003 Masters. In addi-
tion, a number of groups protested both for and against Augusta
National's discriminatory policies. 1
Ballesteros won in 1980, just four days after his 23rd birthday, becoming the Tour-
nament's youngest winner to date. "In 1986 at age 46, Nicklaus donned his sixth
Green Jacket. And in 1997, Tiger Woods broke the Tournament four-day scoring
record that had stood for [thirty-two] years." Id.
7. See Bamberger, supra note 1, 2 (discussing controversy over Augusta Na-
tional's policy of permitting only male members).
. 8. See id. 77 7-8 (discussing NCWO's involvement in pursuing admission of
women at Augusta National). Burk, in a letter addressed to William "Hootie"
Johnson, chairman of Augusta National, urged the club to review its policies "so
that [discrimination was] not an issue when the tournament [was] staged next
year." Id.; see also Associated Press, Burk to File for Protest Permit, GoLFWORLD, Feb.
25, 2003 [hereinafter Burk Protest], available at http://www.golfdigest.com/news
andtour/index.ssf?/newsandtour/20030225burk.html.
9. See Associated Press, Times: Woods Should Skip Masters, GOLFWORLD, Nov. 18,
2002 (discussing New York Times editorial calling on Tiger Woods and other pro-
fessionals to boycott 2003 Masters), available at http://www.golfdigest.com/news
andtour/index.ssP/newsandtour/20021118woods.html.
10. See Associated Press, Tiger Sticking with His Opinion, GoLFWORLD, Nov. 19,
2002 (noting Tiger Woods' position on admission of women at Augusta National),
available at http://www.golfdigest.com/newsandtour/index.sso./newsandtour/
20021119woods.html. Tiger Woods feels women should be admitted as members
at Augusta National, but he believes it is for the members to decide. See id. 3.
Tiger stated he is an honorary member, without voting rights, and that the admis-
sion of women is not a decision for him to make. See id.
11. See Burk Protest, supra note 8 (discussing NCWO applicatioir for permit to
protest at Masters); see also Associated Press, Ku Klux Klan Backs Augusta National,
GOLFWORLD, Feb. 28, 2003 (noting application for protest permits by Ku Klux
Klan ("KKK") splinter group and Reverend Jesse Jackson's Rainbow/PUSH Coali-
tion), available at http://www.golfdigest.com/newsandtour/index.ssfP/newsand
tour/20030228kkk.html. A KKK splinter group intended to demonstrate to show
its support of Augusta National's discriminatory policy. See id. 1 1. The Imperial
Wizard, Joseph Harper, remarked, "[t] his equal rights stuff has gotten out of hand
[Vol. 11: p. III
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GENDER DISCRIMINATION AT AUGUSTA
This Comment will examine the constitutional issues that arise
when dealing with freedom of association with respect to "private
clubs," and the possible remedies that may be sought by those who
find themselves victims of discrimination by these clubs. Section II
surveys the history and development of the freedom of associa-
tion.' 2 That section will explore federal constitutional, federal leg-
islative, and state statutory protections established to secure redress
for individuals who are the victims of discrimination by "men's
clubs."''13 Additionally, Section II will review recent Supreme Court
precedent, as well as examine the history of gender discrimination
in private golf clubs. 14 Next, Section III will analyze the current
situation confronting the admission of women at Augusta National
using a hypothetical client situation, and suggest possible avenues
to help end gender discrimination at this exclusive golf club. 15 Fi-
nally, Section IV will address the possible impact of significant
changes affecting discriminatory practices and the likelihood of
federal or state relief.16
II. BACKGROUND
A. History of Freedom of Association
There is no express grant of the right of freedom of association
within the Constitution. I7 Yet, courts infer this right through other
"rights and protections guaranteed by the Constitution."' 8 In 1958,
Id. 2. Augusta National Spokesman, Glenn Greenspan, replied,
[a] nyone who knows anything about Augusta National Golf Club or its members
knows this is not something that the club would welcome or encourage'...." Id.
5 (comma omitted).
12. For a survey of the history of Freedom of Association, see infra notes 17-47
and accompanying text.
13. For a discussion of federal and state protections against discrimination,
see infra notes 48-92 and accompanying text.
14. For a review of the Supreme Court precedent in the area of private clubs,
see infra notes 93-123 and accompanying text. For an analysis of the history of
gender discrimination in golf clubs and at Augusta National, see infra notes 124-65
and accompanying text.
15. For an analysis of the present policy of gender discrimination at Augusta
National, see infra notes 166-81 and accompanying text. For suggestions that may
assist in ending gender discrimination at Augusta National, see infra notes 182-96
and accompanying text.
16. For a discussion of the impact that significant changes may have on the
current gender discrimination, see infra notes 197-200 and accompanying text.
17. See Lois M. McKenna, Note, Freedom of Association or Gender Discrimination?
New York State Club Association v. City of New York, 38 Am. U. L. REV. 1061, 1063
(1989) (noting freedom of association not expressly granted in Constitution, but
courts allow inference thereof from other rights and protections).
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the Supreme Court first recognized the right of freedom of associa-
tion in NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson,19 where the Court pre-
vented Alabama from prohibiting the NAACP from operating in
the state. 20 In Patterson, the Court stated that the freedom to associ-
ate, for the purpose of advancing ideas and beliefs, was an integral
part "of the 'liberty' assured by the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment, which embraced freedom of speech."21 The
Court concluded that freedom of association should be granted the
same protection as all other enumerated constitutional rights. 22
Two schools of thought on associational rights emerged follow-
ing the judicial establishment of freedom of association. 23 The first
of these rights was expressive association, based on the First Amend-
ment right to associate with others in ideological pursuits.24 The
second right was intimate association. 25 This right was derived from
the right to privacy found implicit in the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 26
1. Right of Expressive Association
The Supreme Court has attempted to clarify the activities that
would be protected under the right of expressive association. In
NAACP v. Button,27 the Court held that litigation was a protected
form of expression, and there was no compelling state interest in
preventing the NAACP from soliciting potential plaintiffs as a
19. 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
20. See McKenna, supra note 17, at 1063 (citing Patterson, 357 U.S. at 451-52,
460-61 (1958)).
21. Patterson, 357 U.S. at 460.
22. See id. at 461 (calling freedom of speech, press, and association "indispen-
sable liberties"); cf McKenna, supra note 17, at 1064 (restating Supreme Court's
adoption of right to freedom of association). "In the [Patterson] opinion, the
Court decreed that freedom of association would possess the same status as those
rights specifically enumerated in the Constitution." Id. (footnote omitted).
23. See Nancy Kamp, Gender Discrimination at Private Golf Clubs, 5 SPORTS LAw.
J. 89, 97 (1998) (citing Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617-18
(1984)).
24. See id. (citing Roberts, 468 U.S. at 622). "[E]xpressive association . . .is
based on the 'right to engage in activities protected by the First Amendment... to
associate with others in pursuit of a wide variety of political, social, economic, edu-
cational, religious, and cultural ends.'" Id. (quoting Roberts, 468 U.S. at 622).
25. See id.
26. See id. (citing Patricia E. Willard, Comment, The Affirmation of State Author-
ity to Prohibit Sex Discrimination in Public Accommodations, 38 RUTGERS L. REv. 341,
365 (1986) (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390, 399 (1923))).
27. 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
[Vol. 11: p. 111
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means to encourage social change. 28 Absent a compelling interest,
the Court has been extremely reluctant to limit a group's right to
expressive association, as it does not wish to interfere with constitu-
tionally protected speech. 29 Due to such reluctance, clubs may use
the protected right of expressive association to maintain discrimina-
tory practices and exclude individuals or particular groups from
membership consideration. 30 The courts have countered this belief
by holding that there is no absolute right to discriminate within the
expressive association doctrine.3 1 Further, only completely private
clubs maintain the ability to discriminate in the selection of their
members.32
2. Right of Intimate Association
The right of intimate association originates from the right to
privacy and is an essential element of personal liberty. 33 The Su-
preme Court has long recognized that the Bill of Rights was
adopted to protect "individual liberty [and] ... afford the forma-
tion and preservation of certain kinds of highly personal relation-
ships a substantial measure of sanctuary from unjustified
interference by the State. '3 4 The Court has interpreted the right of
intimate association as protecting an individual's right to form and
maintain intimate relations with others, as well as "an indispensable
means of preserving other individual liberties. '35
The right of intimate association was developed during the
1920s with the first right to privacy cases.36 In Meyer v. Nebraska37
28. See McKenna, supra note 17, at 1066 (citing Button, 371 U.S. at 429, 438-
39).
29. See Button, 371 U.S. at 438-39 (noting only compelling state interestjusti-
fies interference with constitutionally protected speech); see also McKenna, supra
note 17, at 1066 (referring to Court's "laissez-faire" attitude towards intimate
groups to avoid interference with protected speech).
30. See McKenna, supra note 17, at 1066 (citing Gerald L. Edgar, Note, Roberts
v. United StatesJaycees: Does the Right of Free Association Imply an Absolute Right of Private
Discrimination?, 1986 UTAH L. REV. 373, 376 (1986)).
31. See id. (citing United States Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534
(1973) (holding dislike for particular group not sufficient to justify exclusion)).
32. See I. Lucretia Hollingsworth, Note, Sex Discrimination in Private Clubs, 29
HASTINGS L.J. 417, 421 (1977) (arguing discrimination against particular group
permissible only if club truly private).
33. See Kamp, supra note 23, at 97 (referring to origins of right of intimate
association).
34. Id. (quoting Roberts v. United StatesJaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618 (1984)).
35. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618 (1984).
36. See McKenna, supra note 17, at 1068 (noting Supreme Court laid founda-
tion for right to privacy when deciding several cases in 1920s).
37. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
2004]
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and Pierce v. Society of Sisters,38 the Supreme Court recognized the
right to privacy within the family and established the right for par-
ents to maintain control over rearing their children.3 9 These pa-
rental rights were later clarified and extended through subsequent
judicial decisions. 40 In Prince v. Massachusetts,41 the Court held that
the state was precluded from interfering with the family unit within
the confines of the home.42 However, the Court stressed that this
protection was confined to the home, and the state may regulate
family activities only when they enter into the public sphere.43
In 1965, the Supreme Court came close to formalizing a right
to privacy when it declared a Connecticut statute forbidding the
distribution of contraceptives to married couples unconstitu-
tional. 44 In Griswold v. Connecticut,4 5 the Court recognized that the
intimacy of a marital relationship should be protected from govern-
mental intrusion.46 Later cases expanded the right to privacy and
held that not only were marital and family rights protected, but re-
productive and sexual preference rights as well. 4 7
38. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
39. See McKenna, supra note 17, at 1068 (citing Meyer as striking down Ne-
braska statute requiring all school children be taught only in English, even if non-
speakers, and Pierce as declaring act requiring parents to send their children to
public school unconstitutional).
40. See id. (noting later decisions expanding right to privacy).
41. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
42. See McKenna, supra note 17, at 1068 (citing Prince, 321 U.S. at 165-66).
43. See id. (citing Prince, 321 U.S. at 165). The Court in Prince noted the
mother of a nine-year-old girl was guilty of violating state child labor laws when she
allowed her daughter to sell religious magazines on the street. See id. (citing Prince,
321 U.S. at 159-62). Prince, a Jehovah's Witness, felt it was his religious duty to sell
the literature to the public. See id. (citing Prince, 321 U.S. at 162-63).
44. See McKenna, supra note 17, at 1068-69 (citing Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479, 482, 484 (1965)).
45. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
46. See id. at 485-86.
We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights - older than
our political parties, older than our school system. Marriage is a coming
together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the
degree of being sacred. It is an association that promotes a way of life,
not causes; a harmony in living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not
commercial or social projects. Yet it is an association for as noble a pur-
pose as any involved in our prior decisions.
Id. at 486.
47. See McKenna, supra note 17, at 1069-71; see also Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S.
Ct. 2472, 2484 (2003) (overruling Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (hold-
ing privacy right does not extend to consensual sodomy for homosexuals));
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992) (reaffirming right to termi-
nate pregnancy prior to viability of fetus); Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494,
498-99 (1977) (holding ordinance defining family for purpose of housing regula-
tion unconstitutional); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164-66 (1973) (holding decision
to give birth or terminate pregnancy is individual's choice); Eisenstadt v. Baird,
[Vol. 11: p. III
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B. Federal Civil Rights Protection
1. The Constitution
The United States Constitution provides virtually no protection
from the discriminatory practices of private clubs.48 The Equal Pro-
tection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits discrimina-
tion only when it is a "state action. '49 The actions of a private golf
club usually do not rise to the level of state action. 50 However,
there are three tests that, if satisfied, would qualify private clubs as a
state actor under the Equal Protection Clause. 51 These tests are: 1)
the public function test, 2) the state compulsion test, and 3) the
joint action or "nexus" test.52 Unfortunately, for victims of private
discrimination, none of these tests are useful in categorizing the
private action of clubs as state action. 53
It appears the only potential constitutional remedy lies within a
freedom of association attack on First Amendment grounds. The
First Amendment ensures freedom of association protection for
those private clubs not involved in a significant amount of commer-
cial activity.5 4 Private clubs involved in commercial pursuits that en-
405 U.S. 438, 443 (1972) (holding unconstitutional statute prohibiting distribution
of contraceptives to unmarried persons). The Court in Lawrence stated private sex-
ual conduct is protected by the Due Process Clause of the Constitution. See Law-
rence, 123 S. Ct. at 2484. Thus, states do not have the authority to make private
sexual conduct a crime, as such. See id.
48. See Kamp, supra note 23, at 92.
49. See id. (citing Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883)).
50. See id. at 92-93 (discussing how actions of private clubs do not rise to level
of state action).
51. See id. at 92 (outlining three tests for private action rising to level of state
action, triggering Equal Protection Clause of Fourteenth Amendment).
52. See id. at 92-93 (developing three tests). The public function test provides
for a finding of state action if a private entity performs a function traditionally
provided by the state. See Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 507-08 (1946) (holding
public has interest in functioning of company-owned town). Next, the state com-
pulsion test asks if the government has taken part in the action to such extent it
can be seen to encourage the action. See Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 380-81
(1967) (holding legislation authorizing private discrimination in housing market
lawful under California Constitution). The final test is the joint action or nexus
test. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 22-23 (1948). If a government's judiciary
enforces the discriminatory action of another by upholding a discriminatory con-
tract or covenant, then a state action exists. See id. (holding state courts granting
injunctions to enforce racially restrictive covenants violate Fourteenth
Amendment).
53. See Kamp, supra note 23, at 93 (noting three tests have proved unsuccess-
ful in pursuing private club under state action doctrine).
54. SeeJennifer Jolly-Ryan, Chipping Away at Discrimination at the Country Club,
25 PEPP. L. REv. 495, 503 (1998). If a club ceases to be private and begins to
provide services to the general public or in any way provides business opportuni-
ties, contacts, or becomes a forum for business deals, then it is possible that the
club may be considered a "public accommodation" and lose the First Amendment
2004]
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gage in discriminatory practices may find themselves without the
constitutional protections they once enjoyed. 55
2. Federal Statutes
Congress attempted to provide some protection against gender
discrimination in our society. Some of the legislation includes: 42
U.S.C. §§ 1981-1982,56 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 5 7 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 ("Ti-
de VII"),58 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688 ("Title IX"), 5 9 and 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000a ("Title II").60 Unfortunately, in the realm of federal pro-
tection against gender discrimination by private clubs, very few of
the previously mentioned statutes provide any safeguards. 61 How-
ever, these legislative measures may provide some insight into po-
tentially persuasive arguments.
In 1866, Congress passed the first Civil Rights Act with the in-
tent to abolish slavery and any remaining "badges of slavery. ' 62 The
protection it previously enjoyed. See id. For a discussion of federal and state public
accommodation restrictions and applicable case law, see infra notes 73-123 and
accompanying text.
55. SeeJolly-Ryan, supra note 54, at 503.
56. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1982 (2000) (providing equal protection of contract
and property rights).
57. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) (providing equal protection under color of state
law).
58. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 (2000) (providing equal employment opportunities).
59. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688 (2000) (providing equal opportunity to women in
education, including sports activities).
60. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (2000) (prohibiting discrimination in places of public
accommodation).
61. SeeJolly-Ryan, supra note 54, at 504-07 (noting 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688, 42
U.S.C. §§ 1981-1983, and 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a have limited utility in preventing dis-
crimination at private golf clubs).
62. Id. at 504; see also 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1982 (2000). Section 1981 sets out
the following:
(a) Statement of equal rights[.] All persons within the jurisdiction of the
United States shall have the same right in every State and Territory to
make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the
full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of per-
sons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to
like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every
kind, and to no other.
(b) "Make and enforce contracts" defined[.] For purposes of this sec-
tion, the term "make and enforce contracts" includes the making, per-
formance, modification, and termination of contracts, and the enjoyment
of all benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual
relationship.
(c) Protection against impairment[.] The rights protected by this section
are protected against impairment by nongovernmental discrimination
and impairment under color of State law.
42 U.S.C. § 1981. Moreover, § 1982 provides for the protection of prop-
erty rights and states, "[a~ll citizens of the United States shall have the
[Vol. 11: p. III
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Act was codified in 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and 42 U.S.C. § 1982, prohibit-
ing racial discrimination by private actors in the "mak[ing] and en-
forc[ing] of contracts" and sale or rental of property. 63 These
protections have limited applicability with regards to discriminatory
membership practices of private golf clubs; however, the Supreme
Court has held that in some instances membership in private clubs
is the equivalent to becoming "part of that property."64
Another possible avenue for protection against discrimination
is 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides for "equal protection under
color of state law." 65 Section 1983 prevents any state action from
denying an individual equal protection. 66 Therefore, it is extremely
difficult to invoke § 1983 protection against discriminatory actions
taken by private golf clubs because their actions do not rise to the
level of state action. 67 The Supreme Court has held that licensing
and regulations enforced by a state do not rise to the level of state
involvement.68 Accordingly, it has been held that the mere issu-
ance of a liquor license to a club is insufficient to qualify as state
same right, in every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens
thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and per-
sonal property."
42 U.S.C. § 1982.
63. Jolly-Ryan, supra note 54, at 504 (footnotes omitted).
64. Id. (citing Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n, 410 U.S. 431, 437
(1973) (finding membership created property right and discriminatory member-
ship policy violated § 1982); Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229, 236
(1969) (holding leasehold and membership in nonprofit company offering recrea-
tional facilities constituted property)).
65. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This section provides for a "civil action for deprivation
of rights" and states:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, cus-
tom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, sub-
jects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against
a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial
capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree
was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. For the purposes of this
section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Co-
lumbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.
Id.
66. SeeJolly-Ryan, supra note 54, at 504 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
67. See id. at 504-05. For a discussion of state action theories, see supra notes
48-54 and accompanying text.
68. SeeJolly-Ryan, supra note 54, at 505 (citing Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis,
407 U.S. 163 (1972) (holding mere issuance of state liquor license insufficient to
constitute state action)).
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action under § 1983.69 Given the limited scope of protection that§ 1983 provides against private club discrimination, it is logical to
pursue a different avenue when attempting to confront this form of
gender discrimination.
Following the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Con-
gress attempted to ensure the equal protection of women in educa-
tional and athletic activities at public schools. 70 One commentator
has described Title IX of the Education Amendments as the only
federal protection against gender discrimination. 7' Unfortunately,
Title IX offers no protection against discrimination by private golf
clubs. However, it does provide for a strong, logical argument ap-
pealing to members' common sense: if many of these private clubs
allow female teams to practice and compete on their courses, while
at the same time allowing the wives of male members to play on the
course and use the facilities, then little is being accomplished by the
clubs' exclusive membership policies. 72
The last federal legislative protection relevant to confronting
gender discrimination does not directly address gender on its
face. 73 Congress enacted this protection through Title II of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964.74 Title II prohibits discrimination "on the
69. See id. at 505 (noting limited utility of § 1983 in eliminating discrimi-
nation).
70. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2000). This section reads, in pertinent part, " [n]o per-
son in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation
in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any educa-
tion program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance . . . ." Id.
71. SeeJolly-Ryan, supra note 54, at 505-06 (quoting Thomas H. Sawyer, Private
Golf Clubs: Freedom of Expression and the Right to Privacy, 3 MARq. SPORTS LJ. 187, 199
(1993) ("Title IX stands alone at the Federal level to fight against gender
discrimination.")).
72. See Thomas H. Sawyer, Private Golf Clubs: Freedom of Expression and the Right
To Privacy, 3 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 187, 198 (1993) (noting use of private club facilities
by high school and collegiate athletes subject to Title IX).
73. SeeJolly-Ryan, supra note 54, at 506-07 (discussing how Title II provides for
protection against race, color, and national origin, but not gender).
74. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (2000); see alsoJolly-Ryan, supra note 54, at 506. Title II
reads, in pertinent part:
(a) Equal access[.] All persons shall be entitled to the full and equal
enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and ac-
commodations of any place of public accommodation, as defined in this
section, without discrimination or segregation on the ground of race,
color, religion, or national origin.
(b) Establishments affecting interstate commerce or supported in their
activities by State action as places of public accommodation; lodgings; fa-
cilities principally engaged in selling food for consumption on the prem-
ises; gasoline stations; places of exhibition or entertainment; other
covered establishments[.] Each of the following establishments which
serves the public is a place of public accommodation within the meaning
of this subchapter [42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-2000a(6)] if its operations affect
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basis of race, religion, color, or national origin at places of 'public
accommodation' that affect commerce. '75 This section of the Civil
Rights Act makes it illegal to discriminate in places such as restau-
rants, theaters, stadiums, hotels, and large entertainment venues. 76
Unfortunately, Title II does not specifically provide protection
against gender discrimination. However, even if Title II were to en-
compass gender, private clubs could still possess a complete
exemption. 77
The exemption provided to private clubs may only be retained
if the private nature of the club is proven through facts presented
by the party against whom the discriminatory practices have been
alleged. 78 Therefore, the club bears the burden of proving it quali-
commerce, or if discrimination or segregation by it is supported by State
action:
(3) any motion picture house, theater, concert hall, sports arena, sta-
dium or other place of exhibition or entertainment;
(c) Operations affecting commerce; criteria; "commerce" defined[.] The
operations of an establishment affect commerce within the meaning of
this subchapter [42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-2000a(6)] .. .in the case of an estab-
lishment described in paragraph (3) of subsection (b) of this section, it
customarily presents films, performances, athletic teams, exhibitions, or
other sources of entertainment which move in commerce; .... For pur-
poses of this section, "commerce" means travel, trade, traffic, commerce,
transportation, or communication among the several States, or between
the District of Columbia and any State, or between any foreign country or
any territory or possession and any State or the District of Columbia, or
between points in the same State but through any other State or the Dis-
trict of Columbia or a foreign country.
(d) Support by State action[.] Discrimination or segregation by an estab-
lishment is supported by State action within the meaning of this sub-
chapter [42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-2000a(6)] if such discrimination or
segregation (1) is carried on under color of any law, statute, ordinance,
or regulation; or (2) is carried on under color of any custom or usage
required or enforced by officials of the State or political subdivision
thereof; or (3) is required by action of the State or political subdivision
thereof.
(e) Private establishments[.] The provisions of this subchapter [42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000a-2000a(6)] shall not apply to a private club or other establishment not infact open to the public, except to the extent that the facilities of such estab-
lishment are made available to the customers or patrons of an establish-
ment within the scope of subsection (b) of this section.
42 U.S.C. § 2000a (emphasis added).
75. Jolly-Ryan, supra note 54, at 506 (citation omitted).
76. See Kamp, supra note 23, at 94 (citing examples of public accommodations
where discrimination would be prohibited); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b) (1)-(4).
77. See Kamp, supra note 23, at 94 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(e) (providing
private clubs with exemption from antidiscrimination provision of this statute)).
78. See Jolly-Ryan, supra note 54, at 507 n.101 (citing United States v.
Richberg, 398 F.2d 523, 529 (5th Cir. 1968)).
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fies as a "private club.. . not in fact open to the public. '7 9 In Brown
v. Loudoun Golf & County Club, Inc.,80 the court stated that a variety
of factors must be reviewed when determining whether a golf club
is truly private and may therefore be permitted to discriminate in its
membership practices.81 Among these factors are: "whether the
club is truly selective about its members, whether the club made
insubstantial changes in its prior operation to avoid the impact of
civil rights laws, whether the club operates for profit, and whether
the club is owned and controlled by members. '"8 2
The Brown court noted that the key factor in this determina-
tion was whether the membership practices of the club were truly
selective, which would be determined by a finding of fact.8 3 The
private club exemption provides a strong means of defending
against a suit on the basis of discriminatory membership practices.8 4
Therefore, because the federal statutes appear to offer little in the
way of remedies for gender discrimination, states have begun to ex-
tend protection through their own public accommodation
statutes.85
C. State "Public Accommodation" Acts
In an attempt to address the limited protection provided by
Title II, a majority of states have adopted statutes extending cover-
age of their public accommodation statutes to include gender.8 6
79. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(e). See, e.g., Nesmith v. YMCA, 397 F.2d 96, 101-02 (4th
Cir. 1968) (holding YMCA did not meet burden of proof in showing private club
status). "The YMCA, with no limits on its membership and no standards for admis-
sibility, is simply too obviously unselective in its membership policies to be adjudi-
cated a private club." Id. at 102.
80. 573 F. Supp. 399 (E.D. Va. 1983).
81. See id. at 402.
82. Id. at 402-03 (citations omitted).
83. See id. at 403.
84. SeeJolly-Ryan, supra note 54, at 516 (discussing how private club discrimi-
nation issue needs reconsideration and methods to eliminate lawful segregation).
85. See McKenna, supra note 17, at 1073 (discussing how federal courts essen-
tially closed to gender-based discrimination actions).
86. See Paula J. Finlay, Note, Prying Open the Clubhouse Door: Defining the "Dis-
tinctly Private" Club After New York State Club Association v. City of New York, 68 WASH.
U. L.Q. 371, 383 (1990) (noting forty states and District of Columbia banned sex
discrimination in public accommodations); see also Miriam A. Cherry, Exercising the
Right to Public Accommodations: The Debate Over Single-Sex Health Clubs, 52 ME. L. REv.
97, 118 n.133 (2000) (noting, as of 1996, nine states provided no protection from
gender-based discrimination, and Florida provided minimum protection for only
restaurants and lodging). In addition to the states cited by the preceding author-
ity, Arizona and Nevada recently enacted public accommodation statutes that pro-
tect against gender-based discrimination. See ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 41-1442
(West 1999 & Supp. 2002); NEv. REv. STAT. ANN. § 233.010 (Michie 2000).
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Additionally, states have tended to define public accommodation
more broadly than Congress, so as to expand the reach of their
statutes and limit the scope of the private club exemption.8 7
The Supreme Court has held that a state's compelling interest
in prohibiting discrimination may outweigh an individual's right to
freedom of association.88 Currently, approximately forty states have
public accommodation statutes that prohibit discrimination on the
basis of sex.89 Many of the state public accommodation statutes
closely resemble federal law by providing an exemption for "dis-
tinctly private" clubs.90 Very few states provide specific definitions
87. See Kamp, supra note 23, at 95 n.37 (citing FLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 760.60(1)
(West 1995); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 273.112 (West 1995); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 213.035
(Vernon 1994); CAL. CIv. CODE § 51 (West 1995)). In particular, the Florida law
made discrimination illegal at clubs "with more than 400 members, that provide
regular meal service, and regularly receive dues or fees for use of facilities or ser-
vices." Id.
88. See Finlay, supra note 86, at 382 (citing Roberts v. United States Jaycees,
468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984)).
89. For a discussion of these states, see supra note 86 and accompanying text;
see also ALAs A STAT. §§ 18.80.200, 18.80.230, 18.80.300 (Michie 2000); ARK. CODE
ANN. §§ 16-123-101 to -108 (Michie Supp. 2003); CAL. CIV. CODE § 51 (West 1982 &
Supp. 2003); COLO. REv. STAT. § 24-34-601 (2002); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 46a-
63 to -64 (West 1995 & Supp. 2003); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 45014516 (1999);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 509.092 to .141 (West 2002); HAw. REv. STAT. §§ 489-1 to -8
(1993 & Supp. 2001); IDAHO CODE §§ 18-7301 to -7303 (Michie 1997 & Supp.
2003); 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5-103(A) (West 2001 & Supp. 2002); IND.
CODE §§ 22-9-1-1 to -18, 22-9-1-3 (1991 & Supp. 2002); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 216.1 to
.20 (West 2000 & Supp. 2003), 601A.7(1)(a) (West 2001); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 44-
1001, 44-1002, 44-1009 (2000); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 344.145 (Michie 1997); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 49:146 (West 2003); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, §§ 4551-4553,
4591 (West 2002 & Supp. 2002); MD. CODE ANN. art. 49B, § 5 (1957 & Supp. 2002);
MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 92A (West 2000 & Supp. 2003); MIcH. COMP.
LAws §§ 37.2301 to .2303 (2001 & Supp. 2003); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 363.01 to .03
(West 1991 & Supp. 2003); Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 213.010, 213.065 (1996 & Supp.
2003); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 49-1-201, 49-2-101, 49-2-304 (2001); NEB. REV. STAT.
§§ 20-132 to -143 (1997); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 354-A:2, 354-A:16 to :17 (1995 &
Supp. 2002); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 10:1-3 (West 2002); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 28-1-2, 28-
1-7 (Michie 2000 & Supp. 2003); N.Y. Civ. RiCHTs LAw § 40-c (McKinney 1992 &
Supp. 2003); N.Y. EXEC. LAw §§ 291, 292, 296 (McKinney 2001 & Supp. 2003);
N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 12.1-14-04, 14-02.4-01 to .4-02, 14-02.4-14, 14-02.4-16 (1997 &
Supp. 2001); OHIo REv. CODE ANN. §§ 4112.01 to .02 (West 2001 & Supp. 2002);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, §§ 1401, 1402 (West 1987 & Supp. 2003); OR. REV. STAT.
§§ 659A.400 to .409 (2001); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 955(i) (Purdon 2002 & Supp.
2003); R.I. GEN. LAwS §§ 11-24-1 to -3.1 (2002); S.D. CODIFIED LAws §§ 20-13-1, 20-
13-23 (Michie 1995 & Supp. 2003); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 4-21-501 to -503 (1998 &
Supp. 2002); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 13-7-1 to 4 (2002); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, §§ 4500-
4502 (1993 & Supp. 2002); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §§ 49.60.010, 49.60.030,
49.60.040, 49.60.215 (West 2002 & Supp. 2003); W. VA. CODE §§ 5-11-2 to 4, 5-11-9
(2002 & Supp. 2003); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 6-9-101 to -102 (Michie 2003).
90. See Finlay, supra note 86, at 383-84 (discussing how states exempt private
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of a "private club," and only Louisiana identifies specific criteria for
determining private-club status.9 1 Unfortunately, because no uni-
form criteria for defining a "private club" exists, it is difficult to de-
termine whether and under what circumstances a woman would be
protected from gender discrimination.
92
D. Supreme Court Precedent
In the 1980s, the Supreme Court decided three landmark cases
affecting gender discrimination in private clubs.9 3 In each of these
cases, the Court held that states with public accommodation laws
have a compelling interest in prohibiting discrimination, which out-
weighs the private clubs' asserted right of freedom of association.
9 4
However, the Court made it clear that any potential conflicts arising
between these competing interests will be fact specific and ad-
dressed on a case-by-case basis.9
5
The Supreme Court first addressed a state public accommoda-
tion statute with a private club exemption in Roberts v. United States
Jaycees.9 6 In Roberts, the Court established a basic framework for an-
alyzing potential conflicts that arise between an individual's right to
freedom of association and a state's public accommodation laws.
9 7
The issue in this case was the membership practices of the Jaycees, a
nonprofit organization founded to "promote and foster the growth
and development of young men's civic organizations in the United
States."9 8
Two Minnesota Jaycees chapters admitted women as members,
an act consistent with the Minnesota Human Rights Act, but in vio-
91. See id. at 384 (discussing Louisiana statute private club factors). The Loui-
siana statute contained the following factors: "1) selectiveness of the group in ad-
ding new members; 2) existence of formal membership procedures; 3)
membership governance; 4) history of the organization; 5) use of club facilities by
nonmembers; 6) substantiality of dues; 7) advertisement of the organization; and
8) predominance of a profit motive." Id. (citing LA. REV. STAT. § 49:146(3)).
92. See id. at 385 (noting lack of "private club" definition in statutes and rela-
tive uncertainty of protection).
93. See Kamp, supra note 23, at 96 (citing N.Y. State Club Ass'n, Inc. v. City of
New York, 487 U.S. 1 (1988); Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte,
481 U.S. 537 (1987); Roberts v. United StatesJaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984)).
94. See id. For a discussion of these Supreme Court cases, see infra notes 96-
123 and accompanying text.
95. See id. (looking at types of associational rights interpreted by Court and
their application to private golf clubs).
96. 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
97. See Cherry, supra note 86, at 121 (citing Roberts, 468 U.S. at 618).
98. Edith M. Hofmeister, Comment, Women Need Not Apply: Discrimination and
the Supreme Court's Intimate Association Test, 28 U.S.F. L. REv. 1009, 1016 (1994)
(quoting Roberts, 468 U.S. at 612).
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lation of the National Jaycees' bylaws. 99 The National Jaycees chal-
lenged the finding of the Minnesota Department of Human Rights
that the Jaycees constituted a public accommodation under the
meaning of the Minnesota Human Rights Act and filed a complaint
stating that the Act "violate[d] the male members' constitutional
rights of free speech and association.' 100 The Supreme Court up-
held the constitutionality of the Minnesota public accommodations
statute by employing a two-part test to determine if a public accom-
modations statute would impose upon another's constitutional
right.10 1 The test consisted of distinguishing between the right to
intimate association and the right to expressive association.1 02 In
determining whether an intimate association would receive protec-
tion, the Court first articulated some basic relevant criteria to take
into consideration, including "size, purpose, policies, selectivity,
[and] congeniality."' 10 3
The second part of the Court's analysis focused on the right to
expressive association. Here, the Court found that the right to ex-
pressive association was not absolute, and Minnesota's interest in
eliminating gender discrimination in no way infringed upon or sup-
pressed the Jaycees' ideas and outweighed the Jaycees' asserted as-
sociational rights. 104 Therefore, although the Court found that the
Jaycees had a right to expressive association, the compelling inter-
ests of the state, coupled with the fact that the Minnesota Human
Rights Act was determined to be the least restrictive means, gave
the Court sufficient justification to find the Minnesota statute
constitutional.105
99. See Cherry, supra note 86, at 121 (citing Roberts, 468 U.S. at 614). The
national bylaws only allowed women as associate members and withheld full privi-
leges, including voting. See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 613.
100. Cherry, supra note 86, at 121-22 (quoting Roberts, 468 U.S. at 615).
101. See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 631 (reversing Eighth Circuit holding and institut-
ing new two-pronged means of analysis); see also Cherry, supra note 86, at 122 (cit-
ing Roberts, 468 U.S. at 618). Freedom of association protects first "the right 'to
enter into and maintain certain intimate human relationships,"' and second, the
"right to associate for the purpose of engaging in those activities protected by the
First Amendment - speech, assembly, petition . . . , and the exercise of religion."
Id. (footnotes omitted).
102. See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 617-18 (1984) (articulating effects of balancing
members' freedom of intimate association and freedom of expressive association).
103. Cherry, supra note 86, at 122 (quoting Roberts, 468 U.S. at 620). The
Court believed the smaller and more selective the nature of a group was, the more
likely it would take on the characteristics of a private group. See id. Therefore, if a
group was relatively small and highly selective, it would be easier for the Court to
find it was in need of protection from state regulation. See id.
104. See id. at 122-23 (quoting Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623, 627).
105. See id. (explaining Court's reasoning in Roberts).
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The Supreme Court reaffirmed Roberts a few years later in
Board of Directors of Rotary International v. Rotay Club of Duarte.10 6
Similar to Roberts, the Rotary Club of Duarte lost its national charter
for admitting women as members. 10 7 Following its charter revoca-
tion, the local chapter sued Rotary International for violating Cali-
fornia's public accommodations statute.' 08 The Court found the
Rotary Club to be more selective than the Jaycees, as it required
that its members be among the "leading business and professional
men in the community."10 9 Much like in Roberts, the Court found
that the Rotary Club did not satisfy the intimate association test be-
cause of the large number of members and the public nature of
some of the club's activities.'10 In addressing the right to expressive
association, the Court found that the admission of women would
not hinder the organization's purpose of "provid[ing] a means for
business and professional men to offer humanitarian service to the
world.""' Unfortunately, the Rotary decision was unsuccessful in
clarifying some of the ambiguities left over from Roberts.112 The Su-
preme Court was able to extend Roberts to more selective organiza-
106. 481 U.S. 537, 544-45, 548-49 (1987) (using Roberts as framework for ana-
lyzing constitutional freedom of association question).
107. See Hofmeister, supra note 98, at 1020 (citing Rotary, 481 U.S. at 541).
108. See id. The Rotary Club of Duarte, California, filed suit under the Unruh
Civil Rights Act seeking an injunction against Rotary International from enforcing
the discriminatory practice and from revoking the local club's charter. See id.
109. Kamp, supra note 23, at 99 (citing RichardJ. Byrne, Note, Infringement on
the Constitutional Right to Freedom of Association of the Members of the All Male Rotary
International Is Justified Since the State Has a Compelling Interest in Eradicating Discrimi-
nation Against Women and in Assuring Them Equal Access to Public Accommodations -
Board of Directors of Rotary International v. Rotary Club, 107 S. Ct. 1940 (1987), 38
DRAKE L. REv. 157, 158, 164 (1988-89)).
110. See id. at 99-100 (citing Rotary, 481 U.S. at 546).
The Rotary's claim to a right of freedom of association did not succeed
because the relationships within the Rotary were not of the intimate, fa-
milial type that are granted constitutional protection: the size of the clubs
ranged from twenty to more than 900 members, there was a high drop-
out rate, and many activities were carried out in the presence of
strangers.
Id.
111. Id. at 100 (citing Rotary, 481 U.S. at 539, 549).
112. See Finlay, supra note 86, at 387 (citing Rotary, 481 U.S. at 548 n.6).
We have no occasion in this case to consider the extent to which the First
Amendment protects the right of individuals to associate in the many
clubs and other entities with selective membership that are found
throughout the country. Whether the 'zone of privacy' established by the
First Amendment extends to a particular club or entity requires a careful
inquiry into the objective characteristics of the particular relationships at
issue.
Id. at 387 n.99 (quoting Rotary, 481 U.S. at 548 n.6) (citations omitted).
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tions in Rotary, but did not set forth clear guidelines for the states
and private clubs to follow. 1 13
The third influential case heard by the Supreme Court on this
subject was New York State Club Association, Inc. v. City of New York. 1 14
New York City amended its human rights law to prohibit discrimina-
tion by any "place of public accommodation, resort, or amuse-
ment," but provided a specific exemption for distinctly private
clubs. 115 New York Local Law No. 63 sets forth the following defini-
tion for a distinctly private club:
[An] institution, club or place of accommodation...
shall not be considered in its nature distinctly private [if
it] has more than 400 members .... provides regular meal
service and regularly receives payments for dues, fees, us-
age of space, facilities, services, meals or beverages directly
or indirectly from or on behalf of non-members for the
furtherance of trade or business.1 16
Additionally, the statute declares that all benevolent orders and re-
ligious corporations are considered to be "distinctly private." 117
The New York State Club Association claimed that the ordi-
nance violated its members' First and Fourteenth Amendment
rights.1 1 8 The Association charged that the law was overbroad and
facially invalid. 119 The Supreme Court rejected these arguments
and found that the plaintiff did not meet its burden of showing that
the ordinance "threatened any particular club's 'ability to associate
together or to advocate public or private viewpoints.' "120 The
Court found that New York City made a good faith effort to define
what constituted a distinctly private club, and the ordinance fo-
113. See id. at 387.
The Court failed to define explicitly characteristics of private clubs or to
establish the boundaries of right of association. Instead, the Court in-
creased the ambiguity by proposing that lower courts judge clubs on the
'objective characteristics of the particular relationship at issue.' Such a
proposal leaves both state and purportedly private clubs without guidance
in determining what activities are private.
Id.
114. 487 U.S. 1 (1988).
115. Kamp, supra note 23, at 100 (quoting N.Y. CITy ADMIN. CODE §§ 8-101, 8-
102(9) (1986)); see also Finlay, supra note 86, at 388-89 (describing amendment).
116. Kamp, supra note 23, at 100 (quoting N.Y. Crry ADMIN. CODE § 8-102(9)).
117. See Finlay, supra note 86, at 388 (citing N.Y. CiTy ADMIN. CODE § 8-
102(9)).
118. See id. (citing NY. State Club, 487 U.S. at 7).
119. See N.Y. State Club Ass'n, Inc. v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1, 11-14 (re-
jecting both facial attack and overbroad challenges).
120. Finlay, supra note 86, at 388 (quoting NY. State Club, 487 U.S. at 14).
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cused on relevant factors of size, exclusivity, and purpose when eval-
uating associational rights.1 21 Further, the Court drew a new
distinction between distinctly private clubs and those that serve a
"commercial" purpose. 22 In states with laws similar to New York,
the success or failure of a gender discrimination suit against a pri-
vate golf club may therefore depend on the level of commercial
activity conducted within the club. 123
E. History of Gender Discrimination in Private Golf Clubs
There is a long history of "men-only" clubs in the United
States. Since the passage of many of the Civil Rights Acts, the num-
ber of these clubs still operating is continually declining.' 24 How-
ever, twenty-four men-only private golf clubs continue to prohibit
women from obtaining memberships. 125 The "old boys' network"
still thrives in many of these private clubs, despite Congress's legis-
lative attempts.12 6 Many of these private clubs allow members' wives
and children to participate in club activities, but their discrimina-
tion in membership practices still persists.127 Some of these private
golf clubs allow women as auxiliary members, but they are not pro-
vided full voting rights or allowed to sit on the board.1 28 Addition-
ally, the members' wives, also called "'WORMS'-Wives Of Regular
Members," are often not allowed to tee off on weekends and holi-
121. See id. (noting State's reasonable reliance on important elements of asso-
ciational fights when determining private club distinction).
122. See Kamp, supra note 23, at 101 (discussing application of commercial
distinction when clubs provide forum for contacts and business deals).
123. See id. at 101-02 (noting level of commercial activity may dictate whether
clubs will be able to discriminate against women in future). In New York State Club,
the Court "approved the use of a statutory presumption that large clubs serving
food and receiving payments from nonmembers are not entitled to protection as a
First Amendment intimate or expressive private association." Id. at 101.
124. For a discussion of men-only clubs that have been forced to allow women
to join, see supra notes 93-123 and accompanying text.
125. See David Owen, Essay: The Case for All-Male Golf Clubs, GOLF DIG., Mar.
2003 (noting 2002 openings of men-only private golf clubs - Black Sheep Golf
Club in Sugar Grove, Illinois, and Southern Dunes Golf Club in Maricopa, Ari-
zona), available at http://www.golfdigest.com/features/index.ssp/features/
gd2003O3mensclubl.html; see also Kamp, supra note 23, at 89.
126. See Sawyer, supra note 72, at 202-03 (discussing perpetuation of "All
White Male Private Club[s]"). "This type of discrimination signals to other mem-
bers of the white male 'good ol' boy' network that deliberate discrimination has
not yet become discredited enough to express proudly and openly." Id. at 203.
127. See Kamp, supra note 23, at 90-91. See generally MARCIA CHAMBERS, THE
UNPLAYABLE LIE: THE UNTOLD STORY OF WOMEN AND DISCRIMINATION IN AMERICAN
GOLF (1995).
128. See CHAMBERS, supra note 127, at 55-71 (describing limitations on ways
women may play golf at private clubs); see also Kamp, supra note 23, at 89.
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day mornings, even if they are playing a round with their
husbands. 129
The practice of restricting women to certain tee-times and only
allowing men to reserve the coveted weekend and holiday morning
times is one of the most common policies followed by these private
clubs.' 30 In many clubs, women may receive reserved tee-times, but
only on one or two weekday mornings. 31 This practice seems to be
based on the historical stereotype of women as non-working house-
wives who are home during the week and thus, more able to take
advantage of weekday tee-times. 132 Of course, this is no longer the
case, as women are now an integral part of the workforce and
should be afforded the same recreational and networking opportu-
nities on their weekends.1 33
Another discriminatory practice at these private clubs comes in
the form of the "men-only grill rooms."' 3 4 Women and children
are strictly forbidden from these dining areas.135 Grill rooms are
essentially places where male members bring male guests to con-
duct discussions or business deals without the distractions of the
family dining room.136 While the men are networking in the grill
room, females are left to entertain their guests in the family dining
room along with the other wives and children. 13 7
The perception that private clubs are purely social is somewhat
misconceived, as many large corporations pay for their employees'
129. See Kamp, supra note 23, at 90 (discussing numerous restrictions on wo-
men's participation). "[S] tandard practice allows only men to reserve tee-times on
weekend and holiday mornings with women often forbidden to tee off until after
noon." Id.
130. See CHAMBERS, supra note 127, at 72-86 (explaining preferential tee-
times).
131. See Kamp, supra note 23, at 90 (elaborating on restrictions).
132. See id. (citing Susan Fornoff, Equal Time - Gender Discrimination Against
Women by Private Golf Clubs, GOLF MAG., June 1995, at 162).
133. See id. (pointing to increase in women's involvement in business, govern-
ment, and corporate America).
134. See CHAMBERS, supra note 127, at 87-94 (discussing men-only "grill rooms"
at several different clubs). This practice is followed not only by all-male clubs, but
also by clubs that allow female members and impose separate and preferential tee-
times. See id.
135. See Kamp, supra note 23, at 90-91.
136. See id. at 91 (implying male members of private clubs prefer conducting
business and engaging in conversations with other male members and guests away
from their families in men-only grill rooms).
137. See CHAMBERS, supra note 127, at 89-90 (discussing desire and need for
women to be able to entertain guests and clients in same manner as men). Efforts
of men-only clubs to maintain a separate dining area include changing the name




Charpentier: An Unimproved Lie: Gender Discrimination Continues at Augusta Nat
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2004
130 VILLANOVA SPORTS & ENT. LAW JOURNAL
club memberships and expenses. 13 8 Additionally, corporations fre-
quently hold meetings and entertain clients at these clubs.'3 9 Cor-
porations receive significant tax advantages for business use of
these private clubs, and executive positions in these corporations
often seem contingent upon club membership.' 40 As more busi-
nesswomen play golf and seek club memberships, more harm will
be caused by the continued discriminatory practices of private
clubs. 141
Our society has recognized that individuals who condone dis-
criminatory practices should be carefully scrutinized if they wish to
be considered for public offices or for the judicial bench. 142 When
Justices Anthony Kennedy and Harry Blackmun resigned their
memberships to men-only clubs, the Senate Judiciary Committee
noted that any future judicial nominee's appointment could be im-
paired by the individual's membership in a club that discriminates
on the basis of sex. 143 Following his nomination, Treasury Secre-
tary, John W. Snow, resigned his membership to Augusta National
prior to undergoing Senate confirmation hearings. 144
F. History of Practices at Augusta National Golf Club
Augusta National Golf Club is considered one of the most pres-
tigious golf courses in the world. 145 Founded in 1931, Augusta Na-
tional's policies have traditionally been determined by the sitting
138. See Kamp, supra note 23, at 91 ("The reality is that membership in these
clubs fosters political and economic power .... Businesses, as well as the women
that work for them, are harmed when women are excluded from this opportunity
to network with clients.").
139. See id. (noting corporations use private club facilities to hold meetings,
events, and entertain clients).
140. See id. (citing Susan Fornoff, Equal Time - Gender Discrimination Against
Women by Private Golf Clubs, GOLF MAG., June 1995, at 203).
141. See id. (citing Michele Marchetti, Kicking Off Their Heels: The Changing
Corporate World is Pushing Women to Make a Play for the Golf Course, SALES & MKTG.
MGMT., Nov. 1995, at 126). In 1994, women made up more than one-fifth of active
golfers. See id.
142. See Finlay, supra note 86, at 373 n.10 (noting twoJustices of United States
Supreme Court resigned memberships to clubs with discriminating membership
policies).
143. See Kamp, supra note 23, at 91 (citing Note, State Power and Discrimination
by Private Clubs: First Amendment Protection for Nonexpressive Associations, 104 HARv. L.
REv. 1835, 1835 n.1 (1991)).
144. See Associated Press, Treasury Secretary Nominee Resigns Augusta Membership,
GOLF DIG., Dec. 10, 2002, 1, available at http://www.golfdigest.com/news
andtour/index.ssf?/newsandtour/20021210snow.html. However, White House
spokesman, Ari Fleischer, noted President Bush "does not judge [membership at
Augusta National] to be a disqualifying factor." Id. 4.
145. See CHAMBERS, supra note 127, at 30.
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chairman. 146 There have been five chairmen since the club offi-
cially opened in 1932.147 Since 1998, William Woodward ("Hoo-
tie") Johnson has been the acting chairman of the club and a
staunch preserver of tradition. 148 Tradition, however, has not al-
ways been the sole driving force behind all decisions made with re-
gard to club membership. 149
In 1990, under the direction of Hord Hardin, chairman from
1980-1991, the golf club admitted Ronald Townsend, its first black
member and the President of Gannett Television at the time, fol-
lowing the crisis surrounding the Professional Golfers Association
("PGA") tournament at Shoal Creek in Birmingham, Alabama. 150
Shoal Creek was the site of one of the PGA annual tournaments,
and it did not admit blacks as members of the club.' 5 1 After many
of the event's corporate sponsors withdrew their funding, Shoal
Creek made the decision to admit black members, and Augusta Na-
tional followed a month later. 152 Because of the events at Shoal
Creek, the United States Golf Association ("USGA"), the PGA Tour,
and the PGA of America amended their bylaws to include language
requiring clubs, which wished to host events sponsored by their or-
ganizations, to not discriminate on account of race, religion, or
sex.153 Augusta National, however, did not go as far as these organi-
zations in eliminating discrimination in its membership practices,
as the club's exclusion of women continues today. 15 4
Augusta National differs slightly from the twenty-three other
private men-only clubs. 155 The nearly 300-member club is made up
146. See id. (stating chairman runs "like a benevolent autocracy").
147. See id. at 30-31; see also Doug Ferguson, Augusta Chairman Johnson Steeped
in Tradition, SALT LAKE TRIB., Apr. 7, 2002 (documenting life of current Augusta
Chairman, William "Hootie" Johnson), available at http://www.sltrib.com/2002/
apr/04072002/sports/726360.htm.
148. See Ferguson, supra note 147, 13 (noting Mr. Johnson calls preserving
tradition "the goal of every chairman"). "The legacy he wants to leave is not one of
innovator, but simply to preserve the tradition, which he calls the goal of every
chairman." Id.
149. For a discussion of issues affecting membership decisions, see infra notes
150-53 and accompanying text.
150. See CHAMBERS, supra note 127, at 31 (discussing near economic disaster at
Shoal Creek when sponsors pulled tournament backing upon learning Shoal
Creek excluded blacks).
151. See id.
152. See id. (recounting steps taken by chairman, Hord Hardin, to admit first
black male to Augusta National).
153. See Bamberger, supra note 1, 6 (noting no group included language
prohibiting discrimination against homosexuals or handicapped people).
154. See CHAMBERS, supra note 127, at 31.
155. See Owen, supra note 125 (noting characteristics of Augusta National).
2004]
21
Charpentier: An Unimproved Lie: Gender Discrimination Continues at Augusta Nat
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2004
132 VILLANOVA SPORTS & ENr. LAW JOURNAL
of America's male corporate elite, which as of July 2002 only six
members were African American.1 56 Unlike many all-male private
clubs, however, Augusta National does allow women to play the
course. 157 In 2002, three of the Ladies Professional Golf Associa-
tion's ("LPGA") best golfers and the University of South Carolina
women's golf team played Augusta National. 158 Additionally, Au-
gusta National has no policy of reserving men-only tee-times, as is
characteristic of many private clubs including those that admit wo-
men as members, and wives of members may also play as guests with
their husbands. 159
Finally, Augusta National is notably distinguished from other
all-male clubs as it hosts the Masters, arguably golf s most prestigi-
ous championship.1 60 During the first full week in April, Augusta
National opens its doors to the public for the Masters.16' Millions
of dollars are raised during Masters' week through television spon-
sors, tickets, food and drink, and pro-shop sales. 162 This was true
every year prior to the 2003 championship, when Augusta National
chairman Hootie Johnson decided that the Masters telecast would
forgo corporate sponsorship. 63 , However, the Masters generates
more than twenty million dollars beyond any money provided by
sponsors and television broadcasters.' 64 This revenue is generated
by men and women alike, who purchase tickets to view the event,
buy souvenirs from the official pro-shop, and enjoy food and drink
from the concession stands.165
156. See Leonard Shapiro, Augusta Feels the Heat, WASH. POST, July 11, 2002, at
D7 (noting only six African-American members in entire 300-member club).
157. See id. (noting Karrie Webb and Kelly Robbins from LPGA played Au-
gusta National in 2002); see also Associated Press, Golf: Augusta Chairman Refuses to
Give Ground, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, Sports, Nov. 12, 2002, 14, 2002 WL
7866021 (noting Augusta National claims women played more than 1000 rounds
of golf on their course in 2002).
158. See Shapiro, supra note 156, 12. Professional golfers Annika Soren-
stam, Karrie Webb, and Kelly Robbins played Augusta National in 2002. See id.
159. See id. 12, 14 (noting Muirfield, site of British Open, prohibits women
in clubhouse).
160. See CHAMBERS, supra note 127, at 31 (discussing wide acclaim of Masters
golf tournament and proceeds generated at Augusta National).
161. See id. (noting Augusta opens course to public for one week every
spring).
162. See id. at 32 (noting championship raises approximately ten million dol-
lars during Masters' week, six million dollars from pro-shop sales).
163. See Ron Sirak, Paying the Price: Augusta National Opts for No Sponsors and No
Women, GOLF Dic., Sept. 6, 2002, 1, available at http://www.golfdigest.com/news
andtour/index.ssP/newsandtour/gw2002O9O6bunker.html.
164. See id. 4 (citing Golf World estimates).
165. See CHAMBERS, supra note 127, at 32 (noting people come in hordes to
purchase Masters memorabilia).
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III. ANALYSIS
In order to further illustrate the obstacles facing women seek-
ing membership to Augusta National, the following hypothetical
will attempt to explore the existing protections against gender
discrimination.
A client walks into your office seeking your counsel. She is an
avid golfer, a very good one at that, and she conveys to you that she
has attempted to gain a membership to one of the nation's most
prestigious golf clubs. Thus far, she has not been successful in ob-
taining an invitation to become a member. Her attempt to gain
membership in Augusta National has been met with the response
that it is a private member club that does not admit women. For
the sake of argument, let us add to the scenario that this potential
client is a distinguished board chairperson of one of the largest,
most powerful Fortune 100 corporations in the United States. In
your conversation with her, she indicates that throughout her life
she has battled discrimination, from her early educational years to
breaking through the glass ceiling in her profession. She says she is
not about to let gender discrimination affect her anymore. What
comfort may you offer her by way of legal precedent or legislative
relief?
A. Federal Protection
In order to determine whether Augusta National may legally
discriminate on the basis of gender, one must look to the specific
characteristics of the club itself and how those characteristics affect
the application of the legal safeguards. 166 First, the Fourteenth
Amendment does not offer an individual protection against dis-
crimination by Augusta National because the club's operation does
not constitute a state action.' 67 The golf club does not satisfy any of
the three tests for state action. 168 The club does not perform a pub-
lic function, as it does not provide goods or services that would tra-
ditionally be under state government authority.' 69
166. For a discussion of case-by-case analysis to determine if a club is private,
see supra note 95 and accompanying text.
167. For a discussion of private club and state action theories, see supra notes
48-55 and accompanying text.
168. For a discussion of the tests for state action, see supra notes 48-55 and
accompanying text.
169. See Kamp, supra note 23, at 92-93 (citing Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501
(1946)). "Under the public function test, a court would not find that a private
club performs a government function, although an argument can be made that
the extensive intermingling of government and business leaders at clubs where
2004]
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Next, the government has not enacted legislation that would
authorize Augusta National to discriminate against women, and
therefore no state compulsion exists. 170 Thus, there is nojoint state
action present, as there has been no judicially mandated enforce-
ment of a discriminatory practice in the membership practices of
the club. 171
Moreover, there exists virtually no recourse for the exclusion-
ary membership practices of Augusta National in the federal stat-
utes that could provide relief for gender discrimination. First,
because membership in the golf club is by invitation only, the prop-
erty and contract right protections of the first Civil Rights Act do
not apply. 172 Likewise, § 1983 does not provide any possible reme-
dies, as the actions of Augusta National, a private club, do not rise
to the level of state action.173 Further, Title IX of the Education
Amendments would offer no protection in this case because we are
focused on the discriminatory membership practices of the club,
and not whether female students are prohibited from participating
in certain collegiate activities. 174
The final relevant federal statutory protection is Title II. Un-
fortunately, Title II does not directly address gender, and thus of-
fers no protection against sex discrimination.' 75 Title II offers
protection from race, religion, color, or national origin discrimina-
tion "at places of 'public accommodation' that affect commerce."1 76
Additionally, Augusta National would probably be exempt from the
government decisions are made does create a forum for government decision-mak-
ing." Id. at 93 (footnotes omitted).
170. See id. at 92-93 (citing Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967)). "Under
the state compulsion theory, activities such as leasing or monopolistic use of pub-
licly-owned land, liquor licensing, government granting of tax benefits, and gov-
ernment control over a club's labor practices, generally do not rise to the level of
state action." Id. at 93 (footnotes omitted).
171. See id. at 93-94 (citing Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948)). "[U]nder
the joint action .. .theory ... no state action would be found at a private club
because the discrimination would be deemed private and not judicially enforced
by the state." Id. at 93.
172. SeeJolly-Ryan, supra note 54, at 504 (discussing possible contract or prop-
erty claims). "[Miembership in a private club ordinarily does not involve property
or contract rights. However, in limited circumstances, the Supreme Court has
held that private club membership can be so closely associated with the sale or
lease of property as to become 'part of that property.'" Id. (footnotes omitted).
173. For a discussion of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, see supra notes 56-69 and accompa-
nying text.
174. For a discussion of Title IX, see supra notes 70-72 and accompanying
text.
175. For a discussion of Title II, see supra notes 73-77 and accompanying text.
176. Jolly-Ryan, supra note 54, at 506 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(a) (1994)).
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application of this provision even if it did encompass gender, as it is
a private club with highly selective membership practices. 177
B. Public Advocacy for a Public Accommodation Act in Georgia
The next logical step is to look at the relevant state and local
laws that may provide some protection from gender discrimination
by Augusta National. Unfortunately, Georgia is one of five states
without a public accommodation statute that addresses private
country clubs. 178 Further, only one city in the state, Atlanta, has a
city ordinance tailored after the New York City ordinance prohibit-
ing discriminatory practices by private clubs with more than "four
hundred members, serving meals, and receiving payments for dues,
fees, use of space, facilities, services, meals, or beverages for the fur-
therance of business or trade."'1 79 This ordinance has no authority
over Augusta National since it is not located within the city limits of
Atlanta, but in an entirely different county of Georgia.' 80 The fact
that neither the state of Georgia, nor the city of Augusta, has laws
prohibiting discrimination on the basis of gender by a golf club ap-
pears to insulate the membership practices of public accommoda-
tions or private clubs for the time being.' 8'
C. Other Avenues for Protection
The unique nature of the situation surrounding Augusta Na-
tional leads to an exploration of additional avenues of protection.
Among the possible methods that may be used to challenge the
discrimination in membership practices at private clubs are: 1) revi-
sions in the Internal Revenue Code, 2) revisions in the state tax
code, and 3) restructuring of liquor laws. 182
177. See Brown v. Loudoun Golf & Country Club, Inc., 573 F. Supp. 399, 402-
03 (E.D. Va. 1983) (discussing how membership practices will be key factor in
determining whether club is private). "Relevant here are the size of the club's
membership fee, whether and how many white applicants have been denied mem-
bership relative to the total number of white applicants... whether the club adver-
tises its memberships .... and whether the club has well-defined membership
policies . . . ." Id. at 403 (citations omitted).
178. See CHAMBERS, supra note 127, at 226 (listing four other states: Arkansas,
Mississippi, North Carolina, and Texas).
179. Id. at 226-27 (discussing New York ordinance and cities adopting similar
laws).
180. See id. (stating Atlanta, along with several other cities, have ordinances
modeled after New York City's law).
181. See id.
182. See Kamp, supra note 23, at 103-07 (discussing possible means of pressur-
ing clubs to end discriminatory practices).
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1. Internal Revenue Code Revisions
Under § 501 (c) (7) of the Internal Revenue Code,' 83 clubs are
exempt from paying income taxes if they are "organized [primarily]
for pleasure, recreation, and other nonprofitable purposes, sub-
stantially all of the activities of which are for such purposes and no
part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private
shareholder."' 84 This private club tax exemption does not apply if
the club discriminates on the basis of race, color, or religion; how-
ever, application of the exemption is not limited by gender discrim-
ination. 18 5 Certainly, if this provision included gender
discrimination as a basis for disqualification, many private clubs
would feel the financial pinch of losing their income tax exempt
status. However, as this step may assist in eliminating the discrimi-
natory practices of some clubs, such a revision probably would not
affect Augusta National. Even if Augusta National was required to
pay income tax, it seems likely the club would rather do so than be
forced to admit women, thus it seems unlikely that change could be
fostered through revision of the Internal Revenue Code.
18 6
2. Revisions of State Tax Code
The next possible means of applying pressure to a private golf
club is through the removal of any preferable state property tax
exemptions currently accessible to clubs that discriminate. 18 7 Mary-
land and Minnesota both adopted "Open Space" tax laws, exempt-
ing from property taxes clubs that do not discriminate on the basis
183. 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(7) (2000).
184. Id.
185. See Kamp, supra note 23, at 107 (citing 26 U.S.C. § 501(i) (1994)). Sec-
tion 501(i) states:
Notwithstanding subsection (a), an organization which is described in
subsection (c) (7) shall not be exempt from taxation under subsection (a)
for any taxable year if, at any time during such taxable year, the charter,
bylaws, or other governing instrument, of such organization or any writ-
ten policy statement of such organization contains a provision which pro-
vides for discrimination against any person on the basis of race, color, or
religion.
§ 501 (i).
186. See Sirak, supra note 163, 11 (stating Augusta National chairman will not
be bullied into admitting females and will defend with offense). It is reasonable to
think if the club was willing to drop all sponsors that it would be willing to pay its
taxes even if the Internal Revenue Code were amended to include gender discrimi-
nation as a basis for prohibition from tax exemption. See Kamp, supra note 23, at
107.
187. See Kamp, supra note 23, at 105-06 (discussing litigation against Burning
Tree Country Club in Maryland resulting in almost one million dollars in back
taxes assessed).
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of sex or marital status. 18 8 In State v. Burning Tree Club, Inc.,'t 9 a
Maryland court of appeals found it unconstitutional for the Open
Space tax exemption to apply to Maryland clubs that discriminate
on the basis of sex with respect to the availability of their facili-
ties. 190 Maryland and Minnesota have been successful in removing
tax benefits for clubs that discriminate in their membership and
guest privilege practices. 91 Nonetheless, because Augusta National
pays income tax as an entity, it is safe to assume that if the club was
currently receiving any additional tax benefits, it would sooner pay
the difference and any back taxes owed rather than admit a single
woman not on its own terms.1 92
3. Restructuring of Liquor Laws
Many states have decided that if private clubs wish to discrimi-
nate in their policies and practices, then they will have to do so
soberly. 193 States have exercised the right to confiscate or refuse
the issuance of a liquor license to a club that discriminates in its
membership practices or in granting equal access to club facilities
and services.19 4 States have the ability to institute these types of re-
quirements through the power to regulate alcohol use granted to
them under the Twenty-First Amendment. 195 Although this seems
to be an effective means of removing discriminatory practices
within clubs, this attack has not yet proven to be the most successful
approach. 196 Clubs, like Augusta National, may be more willing to
"go dry" than be forced to admit women as members. If this type of
188. See id. (noting provisions "similar to Maryland's or Minnesota's property
tax laws could prove fruitful in creating change for the better").
189. 554 A.2d 366 (Md. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 816 (1989).
190. See Kamp, supra note 23, at 106 (citing Burning Tree Club, 554 A.2d at
371). However, Burning Tree chose to maintain its funds by fees, rather than ac-
cept women. See id.
191. See id.
192. For a discussion of the use of tax law to prevent discrimination, see supra
note 182 and accompanying text.
193. SeeJolly-Ryan, supra note 54, at 519-21 (noting clubs forced to give up
liquor licenses for discriminating on account of race or gender).
194. See Kamp, supra note 23, at 103-04 (discussing confiscation of liquor
licenses).
195. SeeJolly-Ryan, supra note 54, at 520 (citing BPOE Lodge No. 2043 v. In-
graham, 297 A.2d 607, 608-16, 619-20 (Me. 1972)). "A state may constitutionally
refuse to issue or reissue a liquor license to a club that discriminates in its member-
ship practices, because the grant of such a license involves the unique power of the
state under the Twenty-First Amendment to regulate liquor use." Id.
196. See Kamp, supra note 23, at 104 (noting clubs could merely stop selling
liquor and raise membership dues to recover loss in revenue).
20041
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statute were instituted in Georgia, it is likely the Masters would be
played and won without a single beer served.
IV. CONCLUSION
The facts surrounding Augusta National are truly unique. The
club has been the host of one of the most public events in golf for
almost seventy years.1 97 No doubt, the honor and prestige of the
championship, and the golf club that hosts it, will continue for at
least another seventy years. Unfortunately, it appears as though the
next step in ending discrimination at Augusta National must be
taken by the club. 198 If there is still one thing left uncertain, it is
exactly if, and when, there will be a female member at Augusta Na-
tional. It is not a matter for the PGA or the LPGA to decide, nor is
it a matter for the NCWO to decide. It is also not a decision for the
state or federal legislatures to make. One thing is certain; Augusta
National will admit its first female member when it is ready - if a
woman is not admitted under the current chairman, then maybe
one will be admitted under the next. Maybe the next chairman will
bend to public pressure, or maybe change will come simply with the
passage of time. In the 1930s, it was said, "[w]omen lack [ed] the
strength to play golf as well as men."'199 Now, there are golfers, such
as Annika Sorenstam, the first woman to compete in a PGA Tour
event since 1945, who average 265 yards off the tee.200 Time can do
wonderful and amazing things.
Charles P. Charpentier
197. See CHAMBERS, supra note 127, at 31 (discussing long and prestigious his-
tory of Masters Championship beginning shortly after club's opening).
198. For a discussion of how the existing laws do not require Augusta Na-
tional to admit women, see supra notes 166-96 and accompanying text.
199. See CHAMBERS, supra note 127, at 19-20 (quoting GLENNA COLLETr, WO-
MEN IN THE ROUGH).
200. See Bragging Rights: Clash of Gender and Ego as Annika Sorenstam Swings into
Action, CHRISTIAN SCl. MONITOR, May 22, 2003, 3, 16, available at http://abc
news.go.com/sections/us/Sports/Annika_030522_csm.html.
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